The relationship between Corporate Governance and Cost of capital for Thai Listed Companies

Main Article Content

Nithiphak Katisart
Kunteera Arsasri

Abstract

The purpose of this research is to study the relationship between corporate governance and cost of capital for Thai listed companies. Samples used in this study were 300 Thai listed companies. Data collections were carried out by using the 2013 financial statements and annual reports from SETSMART database and company profiles. Multiple regression analysis was used for analyzing the relationship between corporate governance and cost of capital. The corporate governance was accessed by the responsibilities of the board aspect which can be divided into five topics regarding number of board meetings, proportion of independent director, percentage of shares holding for the boards, remuneration for the board and role duality of the chairman. The cost of capital was defined by gross borrowing cost, dividend payout ratio, cash flow from operation ratio and current ratio. The results found that cost of capital in terms of gross borrowing cost and dividend payout ratio are significantly negative to the corporate governance whereas cash flow from operation ratio and current ratio were not related to the corporate governance at significance level (P<0.05).

Article Details

How to Cite
Katisart, N., & Arsasri, K. (2018). The relationship between Corporate Governance and Cost of capital for Thai Listed Companies. Rajapark Journal, 12(25), 322–335. Retrieved from https://so05.tci-thaijo.org/index.php/RJPJ/article/view/121611
Section
Research Article

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