Human Security and China’s Rise as Triggers for Regional and Intra-Regional Cooperation in and between Southeast and Northeast Asia

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ABSTRACT

Since the end of the Cold War, regional cooperation has increased both in Southeast Asia and between Southeast and Northeast Asia, with ASEAN playing a leadership role. Today, regional collaboration is a reaction to two major external challenges: China’s rise and the broad variety of new non-traditional threats. However, the degree of cooperation is still much deeper in the realm of economic security than in military, societal or environmental security. As the analysis of the fragmented notion of human security in East Asia demonstrates, a main reason for this is that many governments promote regime over individual human security.

Keywords: International Relations – East Asia – ASEAN – Human Security – Climate Change

1. INTRODUCTION

In the Asia-Pacific region, regional collaboration can be best described as a means for the governments to mitigate external influences that they fear could endanger their nation-building and socioeconomic development. As the legitimacy of the semi-democratic or authoritarian systems – a regime type particularly prevalent in Southeast Asia – is primarily based on their ability to deliver economic growth and distribute wealth rather than on respect for due democratic processes, an economic downturn could threaten their very survival. Consequently, the governments work together to stabilise the political and economic regional order to reduce shocks and insecurity that could negatively impact on their national systems. It is thus not a coincidence that the stability- and regime-oriented Association of Southeast Asian Nations (ASEAN) has
since the early 1990s developed into the main political and institutional driving force for regional collaboration in Southeast Asia and the Asia-Pacific in general.

Building on previous studies (Gerstl, 2010a; 2010b; 2008a), this article argues that today, regional cooperation in Southeast Asia and between Southeast and Northeast Asia is a reaction to the growing economic interdependence and to the rise of traditional and notably human security threats in East Asia. Chief among the non-conventional threats are climate change with its severe impacts on the political, economic, societal and environmental sector (cf. Buzan, Wæver and de Wilde, 1998) and China’s emergence as a great power. The latter is a development that could undermine the regional balance of power. Rather than raising fears of a military dominance, Beijing’s ascension causes feelings of uncertainty in regard to China’s perceptions and strategic long-term intentions (Chung, 2008, p. 172; Ong, 2007, p. 721). To diminish these uncertainties, the ASEAN members attempt since the mid-1990s to engage, “socialise” and even "befriend" Beijing through multilateral cooperation in institutions such as the ASEAN Regional Forum (ARF) and ASEAN plus three (Gerstl, 2010a). In addition to its socializing strategy, ASEAN attempts to avoid a Chinese dominance through a classic neorealist policy of engaging all major powers (US, India, Japan, Russia, the European Union, Australia ...) to check and counter-balance the rising China.

China’s rise affects not only the regional balance of power and thus inter-state relations but, for instance due to its economic impacts on local markets, also the societies and individuals in Southeast Asia (Gerstl, 2008a). The latter are also threatened by new non-traditional menaces such as migration, people smuggling, climate change, the spread of mass diseases or terrorism. Yet they have also strengthened China’s role, as most of them can only be resolved with Beijing’s active participation (Yahuda, 2011, p. 211). Despite a minimal consensus on comprehensive security, however, there exists no common notion of security in Southeast Asian that would trigger a strong cooperative effort to resolve these threats. A common concept of human security, though, has the potential to become a main driving force for regional cooperation in the fields of development and security. However, this presentation also stresses that in the state-dominated East Asia, similar to comprehensive security even human security is a state- and regime-centric concept. In their “speech acts”, the regimes and ASEAN (2007a), reflecting the regional minimal consensus, emphasise long-term socioeconomic development and stability rather than individual human rights and participation.

Based on a combination of Neorealism and the Copenhagen School (amended with the categories depoliticisation and ASEANisation), this article will conclude that the stronger emphasis on human security in the official Southeast Asian security discourse does not reflect a fundamental conceptual or political shift but a logical evolution of the traditional neorealist, state-centric interpretation of politics in Southeast
Asia (Gerstl, 2010a; 2010b). In a reaction to global political and societal changes, ASEAN has combined Neorealism and a constructivist notion of security with a growing emphasis on the security of the peoples. For the governments, to securitise, depoliticise and “ASEANise” human security, i.e. to frame it under the state-oriented ASEAN Way values and the primacy of output legitimacy, is a rational political decision to promote regime stability. Whether such a fragmented concept directly or indirectly fosters the security of individuals too remains to be seen.

2. A brief overview over regional cooperation in East Asia

After the struggle for independence, most nations in Africa and Asia, but also the already independent states in Latin America focussed on nation-building and industrialisation through inward-looking import-substitution. Regional collaboration was regarded as a strategic means to secure the survival of the fragile new regimes by reducing external interferences in the crucial processes of nation-building and socioeconomic development but not as an objective per se. Consequently, regional collaboration was severely limited to practical aspects such as trade, cultural and technical matters (Bhalla and Bhalla, 1997, pp. 1–9). Nevertheless, functionalists viewed this cautious multinational cooperation as a first step towards sub-regional and regional unity. Indeed, from the 1960s on regional cooperation was formalised and institutionalised throughout the Third World through regional treaties and intergovernmental organisations such as the Organisation of African Unity (OAU) or ASEAN and on sub-regional level (e.g. the Economic Community of West African States or the Andean Pact). Yet, for the ASEAN members the Association was not least regarded as a political tool to halt external interferences in internal affairs from the other members (Kahler, 2000, p. 551). Thereby it was more successful than its predecessors, i.e. the short-lived Association of Southeast Asia (ASA) and MAPHILINDO.

The Cold War was a major catalyst for regional cooperation in the Asia-Pacific – but also an obstacle: Aiming to contain Communism also in this part of the world, the United States introduced a new hubs and spokes policy after the Korea War 1950–53. The fundamental bilateral partnership – the axis Washington-Tokyo – became the main anchor of stability in the Asia-Pacific. Additional bilateral strategic, military and economic agreements with Manila, Bangkok, Singapore and Australia further strengthened America’s hegemony. Due to Washington’s bilateral approach to check Communism, regional cooperation stalled in the region. Yet, the fears of China and Vietnam were also a major reason for the anti-Communist nations Indonesia, the Philippines, Malaysia, Singapore and Thailand for increasing cooperation, leading to ASEAN in 1967 (Gerstl, 2008). ASEAN’s establishment demonstrates that regional cooperation in Southeast Asia has always been driven by a mixture of internal and external motives, traditional security and economic ones being chief among them. However, even though Bangkok, Jakarta, Kuala Lumpur, and Manila have since the late
1960s deepened their collaboration, until 1992 regionalization rather than regionalism prevailed (Fawcett, 2004, pp. 431–434; Dent, 2003, p. 121). In 1976, the Treaty of Amity and Cooperation – a response to Vietnam’s reunification under Communist rule – symbolises a more proactive approach of ASEAN in order to counter-balance the great powers in the region during and after the Vietnam war (Garofano, 2002, p. 514). To become a member of the exclusive East Asia Summit (EAS), a government has to sign the TAC – a commitment Washington accepted only under President Barack Obama.

Even though the perceived threat from Hanoi became the main glue for the Association that increased its diplomatic coordination, in the 1970s, transnational Japanese companies as well as Chinese business networks were the major drivers for deeper cooperation in Southeast Asia. After the appreciation of the Yen and in line with the Fukuda Doctrine, Japanese companies shifted their production to low-income countries in Southeast Asia. As the nations benefited from FDI, technology transfer and increased regional trade (Gilpin, 2000, pp. 265–267; cf. Islam and Anis, 2000), the belief in the market found more and more advocates. In the late 1980s, the Southeast Asian governments faced a double pressure to intensify their cooperation: Firstly, from local business people who criticised trade barriers in times of trade liberalization in Europe and North America (Menon, 1996, p. 3). Secondly, from the international community that was critical of ASEAN’s general lack of action.

The end of the Cold War in 1989/91 created a power vacuum in the Asia-Pacific. Many analysts even claimed that the United States, the hegemonic power since 1945, were downgrading its strategic engagement (Gershman, 2002, pp. 60–61; Leifer, 1999, p. 34; cf. Yahuda, 2011, Ch. 8). This perception was especially critical in Northeast Asia where multilateral collaboration was lacking behind the global trend (Liu and Régnier, 2003; Ikenberry and Tsuchiyama, 2002, p. 70), raising fears that either Japan or China might aim to fill the void. At this time, however, ASEAN was unable to agree on a common security and foreign policy to deal with the new challenges, even though the Southeast Asian nations had already in the late 1980s adopted the notion of comprehensive security. In need of a political vision and a mission, the Association decided to pursue an economic project: the ASEAN Free Trade Area (AFTA), a strategic response to the European Community’s Single Market project and the North American Free Trade Area (NAFTA). With AFTA, ASEAN was on the forefront of the second wave of regionalism that gained momentum in the mid-1980s. Apart from AFTA and the Asia-Pacific Economic Cooperation (APEC), established in 1989, there existed de facto no Free Trade Agreements in East Asia until the end of the 1990s (Gerstl, 2008b). This has significantly changed since 2000, as intra-Asian trade has further increased due to the sophisticated production networks that bind the region together (Kawai and Wignaraja, 2010).
AFTA gave the Association a new purpose (Capie, 2003, pp. 154–155), though, it is also a symbol for ASEAN’s inability to agree on a common security policy able to address the new transnational security menaces (cf. Antolik, 1992, pp. 144–151). ASEAN’s crucial contribution to the pacification of Indochina in the early 1990s (in close collaboration with the United Nations and Japan) did not gain the respect it merited. Thus in the mid-1990s the international community once again questioned ASEAN’s raison d’être. The enlargement, starting with Vietnam in 1995, was – similar to the policies of the European Union – a reaction to silence the critics, yet it also led to a difficult political and institutional adjustment process. So was the establishment of new trans-regional structures, i.e. the ASEAN Regional Forum in 1994 and the Asia-Europe Meeting (ASEM) in 1996.

In 1997, though, the Asian Financial Crisis (AFC) uncovered the deficiencies of ASEAN’s lacklustre integration policies (Dent, 2007, p. 24). Critical of the remedies suggested by Washington and the Western dominated International Monetary Fund (IMF), many East Asian politicians turned to Beijing for political and financial support. Indeed, China, together with Japan, played a positive role in resolving the crisis (Cheng, 2006, p. 94), in particular in the newly created ASEAN plus Three mechanism which connects ASEAN institutionally with China, Japan and South Korea. Initially limited to financial collaboration, ASEAN+3 evolved into the most important multilateral forum in East Asia, today covering strategic, political and economic issues (Gerstl, 2008; Beeson; 2003, Stubbs, 2002). In retrospect, the AFC acted as a crucial catalyst for deeper regional cooperation (Emmerson, 2008b, pp. 62–64; Dosch, 2008).

After September 11, 2001, the administration of George Bush jun. labelled Southeast Asia as the "second front" in its global "war on terror" (Gershman, 2002). Perceived hotspots were Indonesia, the centre of the activities of Jemaah Islamiyah (JI), and the Philippines with its troubled history of ethnic and religious separatism and violence. Accordingly, Washington intensified its strategic commitment to the region. Yet, its focus on counter-terrorism and its method of bilateral (counter-terrorism) collaboration with key allies, i.e. Indonesia, Singapore, Thailand, the Philippines, Australia, conflicted with “the region’s priorities of domestic economic development and political stability” (Economy, 2005, p. 411). President Bush was hugely unpopular among broad parts of the populations. Accordingly, even pro-Western oriented regimes downplayed their collaboration with Washington.

Overall, regional collaboration in Southeast Asia can till the early 1990s be best described as “reactionary regionalism” (Beeson; 2003, p. 251). In the early 1990s, though, the regional political and economic dynamics did profoundly change (Shambaugh, 2005, p. 64), with China’s perceived quest for regional dominance being the core strategic challenge for Northeast and Southeast Asia (Collins, 2000, p. 133). The ASEAN Regional Forum, binding these two subregions institutionally together, was
the organisational response to this threat. While the forum stresses cooperative and comprehensive security, the ARF members do not yet share a common notion of security (cf. Katsumata, 2009, Ch. 5). The most threatening conflicts such as the territorial disputes in the South Chinese Sea or the tensions on the Korean Peninsula, though, are seen as issues for bi- or minilateral discussion rather than as resolution through all ARF members. Overall, in the realm of traditional military security there remains a significant potential for deeper collaboration.

In 2003, ASEAN announced its ambitious plan for an Asian Community by the year 2015, based on an economic, security and socio-cultural pillar (Bali Concord II). At least rhetorically, the ASEAN leaders have started to deepen collaboration in the crucial new sectors identified by the Copenhagen School: the political, military, societal, economic and environmental one (Buzan, Wæver and de Wilde, 1998). However, until today collaboration in the realm of economics is still far more advanced than in the other sectors. Overall, just like in the 1960s, regionalism is still mainly a response to a combination of internal and external threats than a proactive steering of the environment. Even more than five decades after their independence, the legitimacy of the semi-democratic or authoritarian Southeast Asian regimes is primarily based on their ability to deliver economic benefits to their citizens rather than on respect for due democratic processes, i.e. output instead of input legitimacy. Consequently, an economic crisis could be a direct threat to their survival (cf. Cheng, 2006, p. 91). To secure a stable regional political and economic order is therefore a necessity for the governments. New, however, is their much more comprehensive and cooperative approach to security in general and human security in particular (Yahuda, 2011, p. 215).

In the following, this article will focus on regional cooperation in the Asia-Pacific in the areas of military, economic and environmental security.

3. China as trigger for increased regional cooperation in East Asia

While under Mao Zedong the People’s Republic has supported local Communist uprisings in Southeast Asia, from 1978 on under Deng Xiaoping Beijing focused on domestic economic reforms. Apart from the noticeable exception of the brief border war with Vietnam in 1979, China kept a low profile in international politics (Wang, 2005). The success of the reforms, based on the market principle and integration into the world market, however, elevated China’s position in the regional and global distribution of economic and political power. Isolated in the Western world after the Tiananmen massacre of June 1989, China started a charm offensive to redefine its political and economic relations with Northeast and Southeast Asia. Once diplomatic relations had been established with Jakarta and Singapore in 1990 and Seoul in 1992, respectively, China’s trade with these countries boomed. South Korea’s exports to China climbed

From 1991, Beijing and ASEAN gradually improved their relations too, starting with scientific, educational, trade and economic collaboration (Lijun, 2003, p. 2). Until the mid-1990s, though, China followed a bilateral approach (Katsumata, 2009, p. 103). After adopting a more multilateral course, the Sino-ASEAN trade relations deepened: The share of China in ASEAN’s total trade grew from 2,1 per cent in 1994 to 7% in 2003 and 11,3% in 2010 (ASEAN’s exports: 113,5 bio. USD; import from China: 117,7 bio. USD) (ASEAN, 2011; Tong and Chong, 2010; Cordenillo, 2005). Since 1995, the trade volume has increased more than tenfold, in particular since Beijing’s admission to the World Trade Organisation and the start of the CAFTA talks – all this despite the AFC and the Global Financial Crisis (GFC) of 2007/08. Not at least due to CAFTA – the third largest free trade area after the EU and NAFTA –, in force since 1 January 2010, China has developed into the Association’s largest trade partner, while ASEAN is Beijing’s third largest partner. CAFTA has not only economic effects: Due to China’s concessions that benefited the lesser developed ASEAN members, mutual trust in the region has increased. Beijing thus managed to improve its image and credibility (cf. interviews in Singapore and Kuala Lumpur, December 2008). CAFTA, though, put also Japan and Korea under presser to formalise their economic relations with Southeast Asia, signing the ASEAN-Korea Free Trade Area in 2005 and the ASEAN-Japan Comprehensive Economic Partnership in 2008, respectively.

Just like in the non-democratic Southeast Asian states, economic development is crucial to stabilise the authoritarian system. To achieve economic – and thus regime – security, China has interlinked its domestic socioeconomic development with a foreign policy that ensures access to energy and other resources in Asia, Africa and Latin America. This objective is also easier to achieve with multilateralism (cf. Qinggong and Wei, 1997). The pragmatic Communist Party of China under President Hu Jintao has realised that a “harmonious” regional and global order, created through multilateral collaboration, is the *conditio sine qua non* for the creation of a modestly rich, harmonious society with a more just income distribution (Information Office of the State Council of the People’s Republic of China, 2005).

Yet, the question remains whether cooperation has an intrinsic value for the Chinese leadership. Many politicians but also academics, applying constructivist, neoliberal institutional and sociological theories, believe so (Heller, 2005, pp. 141–142; Johnston, 1999; Foot, 1998). Offensive realists, on the other hand, argue that Beijing’s long-term intention is to become the dominant power in the region and it will then (again) pursuit its policies unilaterally (Mearsheimer, 2005; 2003; cf. Economy, 2005, p. 413). Consequently, Mearsheimer (2003) thus recommends a Cold War-style containment strategy, claiming that ASEAN would follow Washington’s leadership. A
crucial theoretical shortcoming of Offensive Realism, though, is that this theory does not consider domestic political logics – Beijing’s orientation on output legitimacy requires a stable regional order for unfettered socioeconomic development – and the Asian “ideology” of pragmatism. Together, they are strong driving forces for China to foster multilateral collaboration.

Yet because of its burgeoning economic and military power many East Asian governments – and the world in general – remain sceptical in regard to the true intentions of the Chinese leadership (Yahuda, 2011, p. 208). Beijing’s role in the ARF seems to justify scepticism. Initially reluctant to join the forum (Guang, 2007), but then gaining trust in the honest (Asian) broker ASEAN, China has now agreed to increased information exchange and dialogue with its ARF partners. Similar to ASEAN, China pursues cooperative and comprehensive security (Yahuda, 2011, p. 211). The crucial South China Sea conflict and the Taiwan dispute, though, remain outside the ARF negotiations, making it easier for Beijing to check its rivals in bilateral talks. Furthermore, in the last years Beijing has upgraded its military, in particular its navy, even aiming to develop aircraft carriers. Of special concern is the "string of pearls", naval bases in South and Southeast Asia used by China in cooperation with the local governments to protect the seaways in the Asia-Pacific. Even though other nations understand Beijing’s need to protect these vital lifelines, there remains distrust. In 2009, the Australian government has in unusual strong words criticised Beijing’s military expenditures in its Defence White Book (Australian Government, 2009):

"4.26 China will also be the strongest Asian military power, by a considerable margin. Its military modernisation will be increasingly characterised by the development of power projection capabilities. A major power of China's stature can be expected to develop a globally significant military capability befitting its size. But the pace, scope and structure of China's military modernisation have the potential to give its neighbours cause for concern if not carefully explained, and if China does not reach out to others to build confidence regarding its military plans."

"4.27 China has begun to do this in recent years, but needs to do more. If it does not, there is likely to be a question in the minds of regional states about the long-term strategic purpose of its force development plans, particularly as the modernisation appears potentially to be beyond the scope of what would be required for a conflict over Taiwan."

Whether China’s rise will remain to be peaceful is an open question. ASEAN’s engaging, befriending and socializing strategy, though, is more likely to lead to cooperation and peaceful conflict resolution than a strict containment or encirclement
strategy based on Offensive Realism. The reason is that through intensified multilateral cooperation, not least in the ARF and ASEAN+3, other nations can get important insights into the strategic and diplomatic thinking and perceptions of their Chinese counterparts – and vice versa. In addition to this positive strategy, ASEAN is engaging all major regional and outside actors to counter-balance China. Thus, unlike in the field of economic security where regional cooperation that includes Beijing will be further intensified, in the realm of military security, China is a trigger for closer collaboration among ASEAN, Japan, the US and Australia – against Beijing.

4. Human Security: The changing notion of security in Southeast Asia

A common, clearly identifiable enemy is one of the best driving forces for regional cooperation. Climate change, terrorism, organised crime, migration, pandemics and urbanisation are also common, yet difficult to define threats that require a collective response. To resolve these threats in a comprehensive, cohesive and efficient manner rather than case by case, a common notion of security is required. This article posits that human security could develop into such a regional security doctrine. However, it also states that for the majority of the Southeast Asian regimes state and regime security rather than individual security still prevail. Although this bias toward state security may be regretted on normative grounds, the resulting amalgam of state and human security concerns might be attractive enough to elites in Southeast and Northeast Asia, notably in China, to foster regional collaboration.¹

Conceptually, ASEAN which has already in the late 1980s adopted comprehensive security seems to be well suited to combat the new non-traditional menaces that affect the peoples in the region. Yet, despite the Association’s promotion of a cooperative and more people-oriented understanding of security, its outlook still mainly features the neorealist state-centric view. Thus comprehensive security has a strong neorealist dimension (Acharya, 2006, p. 249). Consequently, Southeast Asian regimes still stress the primacy of sovereignty and non-interference, of nation-building and socioeconomic development, in the context of political stability and, not least, their own legitimation (Caballero-Anthony, 2004, p. 160). Accordingly, they view the international system, its constraints and opportunities from a neorealist perspective (Dosch, 2008, p. 74; Rüland, 2005, pp. 559–560). Spreading awareness of non-traditional transnational security threats since the mid-1990s has, however, led these regimes to acknowledge as a political necessity the need to furnish human security to their citizens and, to a lesser extent, the international community. The AFC of 1997/98 acted as a crucial catalyst to put human security on the political agenda. Similar to the Severe Acute Respiratory Syndrome (SARS) epidemic in 2003, the devastating tsunami in 2004 and Cyclone Nargis in 2008, the AFC highlighted that the peoples can be more affected by economic, social, environmental or political crises than the state or regime.
Furthermore, the popular uprising in Indonesia against the corrupt Suharto government, culminating in 1998 in a regime change, demonstrated the Southeast Asian governments that the failure to effectively tackle human insecurity can undermine their regime security.

The revised texts of blueprints for the East Asian Community (Bali Concord II), in particular the Political-Security Community (APSC) and the ASEAN Charter of 2007 (ASEAN, 2007a) reflect the rising salience of these new non-traditional challenges. However, the neorealist grounding of the Charter also shows that only Indonesia has embraced the principles of democracy, human rights and human security (Sukma, 2008); the other regimes have nolens volens agreed to a common ASEAN approach. Strong impulses for the promotion of human rights and democratic values can only be expected from Jakarta, from ASEAN Secretary-General Surin Pitsuwan – and from the increasingly active, transnational organised civil society groups (Igarashi, 2011; Soesastro, Joewono and Hernandez, 2006). The ASEAN Intergovernmental Commission on Human Rights (AICHR) can become a catalyst for furthering a regional human rights consensus, if it can gradually reduce the strong governmental influence.

4.1 Human security vs state security in Southeast Asia

This article claims that the stronger focus on human security in the official Southeast Asian security discourse since the mid-1990s is not a fundamental conceptual or political shift but a logical evolution of the neorealist political understanding of the regimes. To identify human security threats, to address them discursively and, finally, to tackle them more efficiently is thus a rational political act and instrumental for the regimes’ legitimacy. Despite the efforts of the governments, as the official “speech act” on human security in Southeast Asia demonstrates, considerable political and conceptual tensions between human and national security remain (Peou, 2009; Kerr, 2007; Floyd, 2007).

Securitising, depoliticising and “ASEANising” human security is a rational political decision of policymakers. This ensures their dominance in the securitisation process and the primacy of state over individual security in both interpreting and implementing (human) security. Even though, as Jörn Dosch (2008, p. 62) claims, the new notion of security in Southeast Asia has already “changed the way the ASEAN states, both individually and collectively, perceive and respond to security challenges”, there remain question marks in regard to ASEAN’s framing of human security and its credibility concerning the concrete implementation of this concept. Tellingly, the ASEAN Charter fails to clarify what the new security concept means. “Human security” and “non-traditional security” are not even mentioned, let alone defined (Dosch, 2008; Emmerson, 2008a; 2008b). Yet, on the other hand, the ASEAN Way, notably sovereignty, non-interference and consensual decision-making, are mentioned
positively. Civil society organisations such as the ASEAN People’s Assembly (APA) and the Solidarity for Asian People’s Advocacy (SAPA, 2006), but also the ASEAN Eminent Persons Group (2000) have criticised these conceptual and political shortcomings. As the Charter illustrates, the organisation has not fully endorsed the individual and democratic aspects of human security. Regional cooperation remains in too many vital areas of human security limited to verbal declarations rather than concrete collaborative actions. One reason is the failure of the ASEAN-10 to agree on a definition and a catalogue of the most challenging human security threats (Nishikawa, 2009). Even in regard to tackling commonly defined menaces such as organised crime and terrorism, it is difficult for ASEAN to implement a robust regional counter-strategy (Gerstl, 2009; Grabowski, Herold and Jordan, 2009; Emmers, 2003).

The main reason for ASEAN’s reluctance to highlight human security more prominently in the “speech act”, though, are the potentially negative politically repercussions of this concept on regime security. Human security, indeed, challenges a purely neorealist view of security (Acharya, 2008; Kerr, 2007). It suggests that security involves a so-called dual concept: that is the security of the state (and its protection from external threats) as well as the security of the people (Lodgaard, 2000, pp. 1–6). Ideally, human security complements the concepts of state-centric security as it also appeals to both external (sovereignty, non-interference) and internal order. In Southeast Asia, though, there are both conceptual and political difficulties to reconcile human with state security.

The concept of a more people-oriented notion of security remained, unlike that of state and regime security, a largely insignificant one until the end of the Cold War. Due to the decrease of traditional military conflicts since 1989/91 many states could afford the “luxury” to address the human aspects of security – in their own countries and abroad. The UN Development Program’s (UNDP) 1994 Human Development Report (HDR) took a leadership role in defining the concept of human security. The peaceful new world order envisioned by the former US President George Bush in the aftermath of the Cold War did not last long – the early 1990s witnessed the highest number of violent conflicts in the international system since 1945. The majority of these conflicts, however, were (and still are) internal in nature, including violent political and ethical unrest in many so-called failing and failed states. The HDR report consequently pressures governments to address the causes of human insecurity proactively rather than merely reacting once events have unfolded. It claims that peace is not possible “unless people have security in their daily lives” (HDR, 1994, p. 1), emphasising that the security of people can only be achieved through socioeconomic development, not arms.

According to the broad definition of the HDR 1994 (Ch. 2), the international community is confronted with seven dimensions of human security: economic, food, health, environmental, personal, community and political security. The first four can be defined as non-political, socioeconomic threats, the second cluster as political ones. Not
surprisingly, Southeast Asian governments stress “freedom from want”, i.e. threats arising from underdevelopment. “Freedom from fear” and the narrow human security school in general, though, are contested among the Southeast Asian elites.

A conceptual and methodological problem of human security is that it is a very broad and vague concept, especially if it concerns capabilities and “real potentials (freedoms to act and to attain)” (Gasper, 2005, p. 225; cf. Alkire, 2003, pp. 25–26; Sen, 1999). The narrow school of “freedom from fear” criticises such an all-encompassing view. It points out that the exact linkages between underdevelopment, diseases or environmental degradation on the one side and security on the other remain unclear (Acharya, 2008, p. 505). The narrow approach therefore prefers a sharper focus, arguing that human security is foremost about the protection of citizens from violence and conflict (IDRC, 2001; Human Security Centre, 2005).

The debate between the two camps of proponents is reflected in Thakur’s analysis that “one ‘leg’ of human security is in the human rights tradition which sees the state as the problem and the source of threats to individual security. The other is in the development agenda that sees the state as the necessary agent for promoting human security” (Thakur, 2006, p. 72). In Southeast Asia, many states possess the ability to implement the very prerequisites that are necessary to pave the way for greater human security, i.e. good governance, including the provision of order, rule of law and other public goods (Thakur, 2006, p. 75). Yet, the process to expand the spectrum of human rights available to their citizens is considerably slow.

While the notion of human security should ideally complement national security, many states, particularly non-Western ones, view the two concepts as competing (cf. Acharya, 2008; Kerr, 2007). One reason is that in the global South, many regimes are more concerned with national security, often deliberately confused with regime security, than the security of their citizens (cf. Jackson, 2007). A successful implementation of human security should increase personal and communal security in these countries – yet, empowered people are likely to demand more political and human rights, potentially endangering the survival of the regimes. Secondly, many developing nations are still in the processes of nation-building and socioeconomic development. Thus they are still wary of external interferences and threats. Very often, the promotion of democracy and human rights by Western nations is viewed as such a foreign interference. Therefore a majority of developing nations was critical of the responsibility to protect (R2P) argumentation of the International Commission on Intervention and State Sovereignty (ICISS, 2001, p. ix). It argued in 2001 that the protection of human rights was a duty of the international community – if necessary, even through outside intervention. And, indeed, rising instances of intra-state conflicts after 1989/91, particularly in Africa and Asia, resulted in an increased number of UN
peacekeeping missions and instances of so-called humanitarian intervention (Helmke, 2010).

Even though both Jakarta and Hanoi stressed at an UN General Assembly discussion in 2009 that the international community has a crucial role to play via the UN channels, notably in regard to peace operations, it should focus on prevention and support national capacity-building (Natalegawa, 2009). Vietnam emphasised the state’s responsibility to protect its own population and that genocide, war crimes, ethnic cleansing and crimes against humanity “and nothing else” shall be subject to R2P (Giang, 2009; ASEAN, 2009b, Ch. 2.3). Despite this restrictive interpretation, the Southeast Asian regimes have started to discuss, however reluctantly, exceptions to the principle of sovereignty and non-interference in light of the R2P principles (Bellamy and Drummond, 2011; Caballero-Anthony, 2009; Kuhonta, 2008). The altered interpretation of state sovereignty, which is now increasingly viewed as being conditional rather than guaranteed, can be classified as one of the core developments of international law in the post-Cold War era. This has automatically led to an increased focus on when intervention is permitted in the domestic affairs of states, most notably for humanitarian reasons. Today, sovereignty is seen as a privilege which may be suspended temporarily if the government is seen to violate certain commonly upheld norms. Even though no official criteria exist which lead to the suspension or even derecognition of state sovereignty in a legal sense, it has increasingly been done in instances in which internal conditions (e.g. human rights violations, natural disaster, etc.) have the potential to develop into cross-border threats. While such a suspension of sovereignty is often only temporary, the heated debate surrounding the doctrine of non-intervention, confirmed in numerous international declarations, including Articles 2(1) and 2(7) of the UN Charter, continues (Helmke, 2010, p. 57).

4.2 ASEAN’s depoliticised and “ASEANised” notion of human security

In the 1990s, when non-traditional threats replaced traditional military conflicts as the main hazards, the constructivist Copenhagen School both broadened and deepened the traditional understanding of security (Buzan, Wæver and de Wilde, 1998; Caballero-Anthony, Emmers and Acharya, 2006; Emmers, 2003). Stressing that security threats can be politically or socially constructed, it has identified new security threats that endanger new referent objects, be it the economy, society, environment or individuals. Crucially, the School’s theoretical framework allows for the securitisation of threats to individuals and groups of individuals, making it appropriate for an analysis of human security.

According to the Copenhagen School, a security actor has to convince a target group through a “speech act” that a certain threat poses an existential (or at least profound) danger to a certain referent object. Once successfully securitised, the issue is
regarded as standing above traditional politics, therefore extraordinary political and legal measures can be applied to resolve the problem in a presumably faster and more efficient manner. In this context, the Copenhagen School has been criticised for being applicable only in Western, democratic societies (Wæver, 2011; Aras and Karakaya Polat, 2008; Wilkinson, 2007). While the majority of the empirical studies do indeed focus on Europe, there are no theoretical or methodological hindrances why the School could not be applied in non-democratic systems. For a period of time, dictators might be able to solely rely on the military, police and security agencies; semi-authoritarian rulers, however, cannot fully govern without public support. Hence they need at least in certain policy areas to discursively convince their citizens about their rightful intentions and policies. Unlike in democratic countries, the aim of authoritarian regimes is not necessarily to gain extraordinary political powers to resolve a securitised threat – they already possess them – but to reframe it as a non-political issue to minimise political debates.

The fact that in developing nations the governments dominate the public discourse and possess “the capabilities to make securitisation happen” (Floyd, 2007, p. 41) actually supports the Copenhagen School’s focus on governmental securitisers. Consequently, the author has in two studies on ASEAN’s counter-terrorism and climate policies (Gerstl, 2010a; Gerstl and Helmke, 2012) examined the “speech act” of the political leaders (head of government and state, environmental ministers, senior diplomats), i.e. ASEAN’s declarations, resolutions and agreements as well as its concrete policies. Though, as civil society groups have started to play “a pivotal role in framing human security through their transnational work in promoting human rights and human development” (Caballero-Anthony, 2004, p. 158; cf. Igarashi, 2011), their views must be included in all analyses too.

Among the concepts developed by the Copenhagen School, securitisation, broadly understood as the process whereby ostensible dangers other than the use of military force are construed as threats to security, is especially helpful in compensating for Neorealism’s conventional focus on states and military security issues. To locate states contextually within societies is to acknowledge that the construction of state security is problematic, thus it should not be axiomatic. Perceived threats to security variously implicate a host of conditions and intentions – political, economic, social, cultural, historical, environmental and so on (Buzan, Wæver and de Wilde, 1998; Wendt, 1997). Not least among these circumstances are the interests and inclinations of governments. Ironically, the concept of securitisation, by helping analysts assess the empirical as opposed to the rationalised basis of officially identified “security threats”, serves to make Neorealism more realistic.

A crucial amendment to the Copenhagen School proposed in this contribution is the notion of depoliticisation – not to be confused with the School’s view of non-
politicization (Buzan, Wæver and de Wilde, 1998, p. 23). When a threat is successfully depolitisised, it ceases to be a subject of political discourse and is portrayed instead as a matter for expert resolution by executive fiat, often through means that are conveyed as being purely technical in nature. ASEAN discourse, far from featuring democracy, participation and human rights as necessarily political enablers of human security, stresses socioeconomic progress – developing the economy, eradicating poverty and reforming social services and the education sector (Gerstl, 2009a; ASEAN, 2007a; 2007b).

Securitisation and depoliticisation are closely related concepts (Acharya, 2006, p. 250). The more successfully a phenomenon is portrayed as an existential or at least a significant threat to security, the easier it is to argue that it should not be a topic for partisan debate. Yet the process whereby a regime depoliticises a securitised threat is itself political in nature. The same is true for “ASEANisation”, defined as the use of ASEAN values – national sovereignty, non-interference, and the legitimacy of incumbent regimes – to limit the scope and sensitivity of security issues as a matter of discourse and policy. Like depoliticisation, “ASEANisation” is both a method and a deliberate political action. Rather than stressing the human rights and democratic aspects of this concept, ASEAN puts emphasis on the provision of socioeconomic and human development, the eradication of poverty, the implementation of long-term reforms in the economic, social and education sector and on the requirement of a broad, inclusive but non-political dialogue with all stakeholders (Gerstl, 2009; ASEAN, 2007a; 2007b). To stress the non-political dimension of a threat makes it considerably easier to achieve consensus for a regional resolution.

As ASEAN’s “speech act” on terrorism and counter-terrorism illustrates, the main target group the leaders of the Southeast Asian nations most affected by terrorism aim to convince are not the citizens but their more reluctant counterparts and other leading officials (Gerstl, 2010a; 2010b). Due to the different threat perceptions in the regions and the different military, policing and law enforcement capabilities, ASEAN as an organisation could not agree on a robust regional counter-terrorism approach. For the governments of Singapore, the Philippines and Indonesia it was nevertheless a success that all members agreed on the (binding) ASEAN Counter Terrorism Convention (ACCT) of 2007 (ASEAN, 2007b). While the Convention can only be a starting point for deeper collaboration, the main outcome for Singapore, Manila and Jakarta is that they have gained the permission to cooperate on bi- and multilateral level with each other and outside powers such as the US and Australia. Overall, ASEAN’s counter-terrorism approach is a comprehensive, but long-term reform project with a strong emphasis on resolving the economic and social rather than political root causes of terrorism and political violence (Gerstl, 2010a; 2009). – In the realm of climate change, selected bilateral cooperation remains the norm too, as the following case study will demonstrate.
4.2.1 Climate Change

Both the International Panel of Climate Change (IPCC, 2007) and the Stern Review (2006) claim that Southeast Asia will be severely affected by the direct and indirect negative impacts of climate change. Whether or not directly caused by climate change, the increased number of cyclones and earthquakes in the last years has demonstrated the region’s vulnerability to environmental risks. Food insecurity, the spread of human diseases or environmentally induced migration are among the indirect consequences of a failure to adapt to climate change. All these threats have in common that they have adverse repercussions on human security.

Yet ASEAN remained until 2005 a climate change sceptic. A noticeable change in the Association’s attitude occurred at the Singapore Summit in 2007, further demonstrated with the declarations issued in the run-up to the Copenhagen Climate Conference 2009 (ASEAN, 2007c; 2009; Ehrenfeld, 2009). The Association, though, still refuses to commit their members to concrete greenhouse gas emission targets. Due to the image of an organisation that still does not respond to climate change with the urgency that this challenge demands, ASEAN risks to lose out diplomatically and economically. The main reason for the lack of cooperation is that, as the Association’s "speech act" illustrates, it has framed climate change under its depoliticised and “ASEANised” notion of human security. In the context of its climate change policies, the organisation stresses energy security – crucial for ensuring economic growth for the regimes that build their legitimacy on their ability to ensure further economic development – rather than individual security. Similar to counter-terrorism, the primary target group of the “speech act” are not the citizens in general (or environmental NGOs) but the industrial sector, as striving for energy security is the main political aim. The economic and societal costs of environmental degradation are rarely thematised (Gerstl and Helmke, 2012).

The ASEAN members are affected to different degrees from climate change and have different economic and administrative capacities to adapt. These different interests undermine political efforts to agree on effective regional measures to combat climate change. Even in the realm of transboundary haze – identified as a severe threat by all member states – cooperation is limited to the three most affected countries, namely Indonesia, Singapore and Malaysia (cf. ASEAN, 2002; Karim, 2008).

Yet, Southeast Asia has a huge potential to adapt to climate change without undermining its economic growth (IPCC, 2007; Francisco, 2008; Greenpeace, 2007). To conduct country and regional assessment reports that identify weaknesses and strengths would be the first step. A much more widespread use of renewable energy and increased energy and fuel efficiency would deliver first positive results. The environmentally sound management of forests can play another key role in ASEAN’s adaptation strategy.
To stop deforestation and haze and promote reforestation and a sustainable forest management has top priority (ASEAN Secretariat, n.d.), and carbon capturing by conserving forests is a promising perspective (Tay, 2009). Increased regional and international collaboration, not at least with first world countries, including technology transfer, would further strengthen Southeast Asia’s resilience towards the negative impacts of climate change. Though, the ASEAN countries must also implement costly adaptive measures bridging human and energy security, such as the building of new dams to protect villages from flooding or establishing regional energy infrastructures, e.g. in the Mekong Delta. In addition to global programs such as the Global Environment Facility (GEF) an own ASEAN adaptation fund that privileges the least developed ASEAN members is indispensable (Luci and Kabiling, 2009).

Climate change might be the next external existential challenge for the organisation to which it has nolens volens to respond. The global focus on this threat, together with increasingly active environmental groups in the region itself, have already pressured the Association to address climate change more seriously. Yet, the sooner ASEAN starts to promote credible national and regional adaptation strategies under the umbrella of a non-fragmented, holistic human security concept, the sooner will human security of the Southeast Asian citizens improve – as well as the regime security of the governments.

5. Conclusion

Since 1989/91 regional cooperation in East Asia and between Northeast and Southeast Asia has increased in general. The collaboration, though, has reached its deepest stage in the realm of economics and finance, whereby China plays a positive role. In the spheres of military, societal and environmental security, though, bilateral and selected multilateral cooperation remains the method of choice. In the field of traditional military security, distrust among the main actors is a huge obstacle for a truly multilateral conflict resolution; rather than involving all stakeholders, talks among a small group of nations, e.g. to resolve the territorial claims in the South Chinese Sea, are favoured. China’s rise, however, raises fears among its neighbours, thus a deeper military collaboration between ASEAN, the US, Japan and Australia to check Beijing could develop.

Also in regard to environmental security, regional cooperation plays second fiddle to national approaches and bilateral agreements. The reason are that the Southeast Asian nations were until recently climate change sceptics; that they had, as developing nations, no legal responsibilities to reduce their greenhouse gas emissions; and that the regimes view climate change mainly from the perspectives of energy and regime security. The civil society organisations, though, do not accept this “speech act”,
pointing out the already visible environmental damages in many Southeast Asian countries, affecting both the nations and the peoples.

The focus on regime security is also the reason for the lack of a deep and robust regional cooperation in Southeast Asia: ASEAN has developed a depoliticised, “ASEANised” and thus fragmented notion of human security. More concerned with the security of their regimes than of their populations, ASEAN emphasises socioeconomic and human development rather than democracy and human rights. Consequently, the Association stresses long-term socioeconomic and educational rather than political reforms. As this regime-centric, depoliticised notion of human security is also attractive for China, it might foster regional cooperation in politically less contested spheres such as economics and environmental policies. Such a concept of human security, however, would mirror the lowest common denominator and would fall short of the expectations of many Southeast Asian NGOs committed to the promotion of a comprehensive notion of human security.

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Endnotes

i Human security is a popular scientific and political concept, not at least because it is open for interpretations, as it still lacks analytical clarity (Peou 2009; Kerr 2007; Floyd 2007; Paris 2004).

ii Already in the human rights debate in the early 1990s, many Southeast Asian governments highlighted economic and social rights. At the World Conference on Human Rights in Vienna in 2003, Indonesia, Singapore and China argued that political rights are a luxury that can only be afforded at a certain stage of development. Beijing also advanced the idea of a right to development, but assigned that right to the state as a ruling institution, not to the individual citizens being ruled (Tatsuo 1999).

iii ASEAN’s approach to counter-terrorism (ASEAN 2007b) illustrates the depoliticisation and “ASEANisation” of security threats. Aware of the domestically contested nature of counter-terrorism policies, and of disagreements as to what constitute a threat and what does not, ASEAN emphasises the technical (policing and legal) aspects of state responses to terrorism and the need to mobilise expertise against its economic and social (not political) causes, such as poverty and lack of education (Gerstl 2009; Grabowski, Herold and Jordan 2009).